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Abstract 
 Although self-relevance is widely acknowledged to enhance stimulus processing, the exclusivity of 
this effect remains open to question. In particular, in commonly adopted experimental paradigms, 
the prioritization of self-relevant (vs. other-relevant) material may reflect the operation of a task-
specific strategy rather than an obligatory facet of social-cognitive functioning. By changing basic 
aspects of the decisional context, it may therefore be possible to generate stimulus-prioritization 
effects for targets other than the self. Based on the demonstration that ownership facilitates object 
categorization (i.e., self-ownership effect), here we showed that stimulus prioritization is sensitive 
to prior expectations about the prevalence of forthcoming objects (owned-by-self vs. owned-by-
friend) and whether these beliefs are supported during the task. Under conditions of stimulus 
uncertainty (i.e., no prior beliefs), replicating previous research, objects were classified more 
rapidly when owned-by-self compared to owned-by-friend (Expt. 1). When, however, the frequency 
of stimulus presentation either confirmed (Expt. 2) or disconfirmed (Expt. 3) prior expectations, 
stimulus prioritization was observed for the most prevalent objects regardless of their owner. A 
hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM) analysis further revealed that decisional bias was 
underpinned by differences in the evidential requirements of response generation. These findings 
underscore the flexibility of ownership effects (i.e., stimulus prioritization) during object 
processing. 
       
Keywords: self-prioritization, prior beliefs, ownership, stimulus prevalence, response bias, decision-
making  
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It’s Not Always About Me: 
The Effects of Prior Beliefs and Stimulus Prevalence on Self-Other Prioritization 
 
For over four decades, research has revealed the benefits of self-relevance during stimulus 
processing. Compared to material paired with other people (e.g., friend, mother, celebrity), 
information associated with the self is easier to detect, evaluate, and remember (e.g., Bargh & 
Pratto, 1986; Keyes & Brady, 2010; Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997; 
Symons & Johnson, 1997). Underlining the potency of this effect, Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012) 
recently demonstrated that the advantages of self-relevance extend even to trivial stimuli. After 
coupling geometric shapes with various person labels (e.g., circle = you, triangle = best friend, 
square = stranger), participants’ perceptual-matching judgments (i.e., do shape-label stimulus pairs 
match the learned associations?) were fastest and most accurate for stimulus pairs associated with 
the self (vs. best friend or stranger), a phenomenon dubbed the self-prioritization effect (Janczyk, 
Humphreys, & Sui, 2019; Sui et al., 2012; Sui & Humphreys, 2017; Sui, Liu, Mevorach, & 
Humphreys, 2015; Sui, Sun, Peng, & Humphreys, 2014). Driving this effect, it has been argued, is a 
mind that is preferentially tuned to personally-meaningful information, such that — via bottom-up 
attentional capture — self-relevance enhances stimulus processing (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & 
Humphreys, 2015, 2017; Sui & Rotshtein, 2019).  
Beyond shape-label associations, self-prioritization effects have been demonstrated across 
different experimental paradigms, stimuli, and sensory modalities (Frings & Wentura, 2014; 
Mattan, Quinn, Apperly, Sui, & Rotshtein, 2015; Moradi, Sui, Hewstone, & Humphreys, 2015; 
Payne, Tsakiris, & Maister, 2017; Schäfer, Wentura, & Frings, 2015; Wozniak & Knoblich, 2019). 
In particular, object ownership has proved a productive task context for exploring the process and 
products of self-referential mentation (e.g., Constable, Kritikos, & Bayliss, 2011; Constable, 
Kritikos, Lipp, & Bayliss, 2014; Constable, Welsh, Huffman, & Pratt, 2019; Cunningham, Turk, 
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Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008; Falbén et al., 2019; Golubickis, Falbén, Cunningham, & Macrae, 
2018; Golubickis et al., 2019, in press; Lockwood et al., 2018; Sparks, Cunningham, & Kritikos, 
2016; Truong, Roberts, & Todd, 2017; Turk, van Bussel, Waiter, & Macrae, 2011). For example, 
Golubickis et al. (2018) presented participants with objects (i.e., pencils & pens) that ostensibly 
belonged either to the self or a best friend and their task was simply to classify the items (i.e., 
owned-by-self vs. owned-by-friend) as quickly as possible. The results yielded a self-prioritization 
effect, revealing response facilitation for self-owned compared to friend-owned objects. Relatedly, 
in a task probing the temporal order of stimulus presentation (i.e., prior-entry effect), Constable et 
al. (2019) demonstrated that self-owned objects were reported to appear first more frequently than 
comparable items that belonged to the experimenter. Taken together, these findings underscore the 
influence that ownership exerts during stimulus processing (Beggan, 1992; Kahneman, Knetsch, & 
Thaler, 1991; Morewedge & Giblin, 2015; Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2003). Questions remain, 
however, regarding the exclusivity of this self-ownership effect. Specifically, is stimulus 
prioritization restricted to objects owned by the self or can it extend to other people’s possessions? 
 
Ownership and Decisional Processing 
 The putative exclusivity of the self-ownership effect derives, at least in part, from its 
underlying origin. Despite the contention that self-relevance facilitates perceptual processing 
(Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015, 2017; Sui & Rotshtein, 2019; but see Reuther & 
Chakravarthi, 2017), studies manipulating object ownership have garnered little support for this 
viewpoint. Instead, self-prioritization has been traced to the operation of a different underlying 
mechanism — a response bias (Constable et al., 2019). For example, using drift diffusion modeling 
to identify the processes supporting task performance (Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016; 
Voss, Nagler, & Lerche, 2013; White & Poldrack, 2014), Golubickis et al. (2018, 2019) 
demonstrated that the self-ownership effect was underpinned by variability in the evidential 
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requirements of response generation, such that less information was needed to generate owned-by-
self compared to owned-by-other decisions. Interestingly, no differences in the efficiency of 
stimulus processing were observed as a function of ownership. Together with related research this 
reveals that, rather than enhancing stimulus salience, self-relevance expedites performance through 
its influence on post-perceptual (i.e., decisional) processing operations (Miyakoshi, Nomura, & 
Ohira, 2007; Reuther & Chakravarthi, 2017; Siebold, Weaver, Donk, & van Zoest, 2015; Stein, 
Siebold, & van Zoest, 2016; Wade & Vickery, 2018).  
 According to Golubickis et al. (2018), reduction in the evidential requirements of decision-
making reflects the operation of an egocentric response-related strategy. Specifically, people 
display an a priori preference for self-related compared to other-related responses. Although 
egocentrism is most strongly associated with childhood (Perner, 1991; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), 
adults continue to behave in distinctly self-centric ways. Indeed, it has been suggested that all that 
separates children from their elders are corrective processes that flexibly counteract the effects of 
egocentrism. In other words, it is not that adults are less self-centered than children; rather, they are 
simply better able to suppress and modify their preliminary egocentric reactions (Epley & Gilovich, 
2004; Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004). Crucially, egocentrism and ownership are closely 
intertwined (Cunningham, Vergunst, Macrae, & Turk, 2013). From around the age of 18-24 
months, children begin to use possessive pronouns (e.g., mine) and, by the age of 4, have a concrete 
understanding of ownership (Hay, 2006). Indeed, conflict between siblings and peers routinely 
derives from disputes over proprietorship (Furby, 1980; Ramsey, 1987). In Golubickis et al.’s 
(2018, 2019) object-classification task, a response bias is indicative of the operation of an 
egocentric task-related strategy. That is, repeated interactions with one’s own (vs. other people’s) 
possessions creates a preference for self-relevant responses (i.e., prior experience tunes decisional 
processing).    
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Self-Bias Under Conditions of Uncertainty 
 Although providing a viable explanation for the self-ownership effect, an egocentric 
response-related strategy may reflect the operation of a transitory task-related tactic rather than an 
inevitable facet of decisional processing. Inspection of the paradigm employed by Golubickis et al. 
(2018, 2019) suggests why. In their experiment, prior to the object-classification task, pencils or 
pens were randomly assigned to the self and a best friend. Critically, no other task-relevant 
information was provided. In particular, the composition of the sample of objects (i.e., the number 
of pencils and pens) was unspecified. Under such conditions of stimulus uncertainty, it is possible 
that object-relevance served as the most salient dimension of the task, thereby triggering a self-
prioritization effect that was grounded in an egocentric response-related bias (Epley & Gilovich, 
2004). In other words, self-bias materialized as a strategic response to the prevailing task conditions 
(i.e., stimulus uncertainty), rather than as an obligatory product of social-cognitive functioning 
(Constable et al., 2019; Falbén et al., 2019; Golubickis et al., 2018, 2019). Had additional task-
relevant details been available — specifically information about the prevalence of the to-be-judged 
items — then object processing (hence stimulus prioritization) may have taken an entirely different 
course.           
Outside the laboratory, judgments of ownership unfold in informationally rich settings. 
Consider, for example, two dwellings: one’s own and a close friend’s apartment. Whereas the items 
in one’s home are principally owned by the self, this is patently not the case at a friend’s place 
where perhaps only a small collection of one’s belongings may reside. Would it therefore make 
sense to prioritize self-owned (i.e., infrequent) compared to friend-owned (i.e., frequent) objects 
when judging the ownership of items sampled from the latter setting? We suspect not. Rather, 
processing would be optimized if individuals were sensitive to the likelihood of encountering (self-
owned vs. other-owned) objects in contexts in which their occurrence varies. That is, decision-
making is guided by the extent to which prior beliefs about the world are consistent with the 
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available sensory data (Bar, 2007). Supporting this viewpoint is the demonstration that low-
probability stimuli are detected less rapidly than their high-probability counterparts (Hon, Yap, & 
Jabar, 2013; Wolfe et al., 2007). Generally speaking, processing is facilitated for probable 
compared to improbable items, with prior expectations about the likely appearance of stimuli 
shaping the cognitive operations that underpin decisional processing (De Loof, Van Opstal, & 
Verguts, 2016; Dunovan, Tremel, & Wheeler, 2014).     
 Of course, despite the obvious utility of information signaling the prior probability of an 
event or outcome, an extensive literature has demonstrated that people can be notoriously 
unreceptive to this knowledge, an effect termed base-rate neglect (e.g., Barbey & Sloman, 2007; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, confronted with reams of statistical information about 
the reliability of German automobiles, a potential purchaser may nonetheless be persuaded not to 
buy one on learning that a colleague’s BMW broke down on a recent vacation. That is, diagnostic 
information is ignored in lieu of a seemingly compelling single experience. As it turns out, 
however, overlooking base-rates in this way largely occurs when the decisional value of the 
information is uncertain. When probabilistic information is plainly pertinent (e.g., causally relevant) 
to the judgment at hand, it is routinely taken into consideration during decision-making (Ajzen, 
1977; Bar-Hillel, 1980; Ginosar & Trope, 1980; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012). This observation 
has direct implications for the generation of ownership effects during object processing (Constable 
et al., 2019; Golubickis et al., 2018). If egocentric responses reflect the adoption of a task-specific 
strategy, then self-prioritization should emerge under conditions of uncertainty when the likelihood 
of encountering self-owned or other-owned objects is unknown. When, in contrast, this information 
is available (i.e., self-owned or other-owned objects are known to predominate), prioritization 
effects should arise regardless of who possesses the items.         
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The Current Research 
Extending previous research, here we considered whether prior beliefs pertaining to the 
likelihood of encountering either self-owned or friend-owned material during an object-
classification task influences stimulus prioritization. Following Golubickis et al. (2018), a 
hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM) analysis was conducted to identify the processes 
underpinning task performance (Wiecki, Sofer, & Frank, 2013). The drift diffusion model uses both 
accuracy and response latency to represent the decision-making process as it unfolds over time, 
thereby enabling the latent cognitive operations associated with task performance to be estimated 
(Ratcliff et al., 2016). During binary decision-making (e.g., is an object owned-by-self or owned-
by-friend?), information is continuously accumulated from a stimulus until sufficient evidence is 
acquired to make a response. The advantage of this analytic approach resides in the ability of the 
HDDM to distinguish between biases in stimulus and response-related processes. In the drift 
diffusion framework these biases are conceptually distinct, with different underlying origins and 
theoretical interpretations (Ratcliff et al., 2016; Voss et al., 2013; White & Poldrack, 2014).     
The drift rate (v) estimates the speed and quality of information acquisition (i.e., larger drift 
rate = faster information uptake), thus is interpreted as a measure of the efficiency of stimulus 
processing during decision-making. For example, during stimulus appraisal, self-relevance may 
facilitate information uptake for self-owned compared to friend-owned objects, thereby 
demonstrating that self-prioritization is underpinned by a stimulus bias (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; 
Sui & Humphreys, 2015, 2017; Sui & Rotshtein, 2019). Boundary separation (a) estimates the 
distance between the two response thresholds (i.e., how much information is required before a 
decision is made) and the starting point (z) specifies the position between the response thresholds at 
which evidence accumulation begins. If z is not centered between the thresholds, this indicates a 
bias in favor of the response that is closer to the starting point (i.e., less evidence is required to 
reach the preferred threshold). For example, self-relevance may modulate information-sampling 
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requirements, such that less evidence is needed to generate owned-by-self than owned-by-friend 
responses, indicating that self-prioritization is underpinned by a response bias (White & Poldrack, 
2014).  
As previously noted, under conditions of stimulus uncertainty (i.e., no prior beliefs about the 
prevalence of self-owned vs. friend-owned objects), the self-ownership effect was underpinned by a 
response bias (Golubickis et al., 2018, 2019). Specifically, self-prioritization corresponded to a shift 
in the starting point of evidence accumulation (z), such that less information was required to 
generate owned-by-self compared to owned-by-other (e.g., friend or mother) responses. Response 
biases commonly arise when one outcome is more likely than another, resulting in a higher starting 
value for the probable (vs. improbable) response (De Loof et al., 2016; Domenech & Dreher, 2010; 
Dunovan et al., 2014; Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2012; White & 
Poldrack, 2014). If therefore participants are sensitive to information indicating the likelihood of 
encountering either self-owned or friend-owned items during an object-classification task, then it 
should be possible, at least in principle, to elicit both self- and friend-ownership effects, with each 
effect underpinned by differences in the respective evidential requirements of response generation.  
 
Experiment 1 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to establish the extent to which self-prioritization is sensitive 
to prior information indicating the likelihood that self-owned (vs. friend-owned) items will be 
encountered during an object-classification task. Following Golubickis et al. (2018, 2019), 
participants were presented with objects (i.e., pencils and pens) that ostensibly belonged either to 
the self or a friend and their task was simply to classify the items as a function of their ownership. 
Critically, whereas half the participants were given no prior information about the sample of objects 
(i.e., ‘stimulus-uncertainty’ condition), the others were told there was an equal likelihood (i.e., 
Self-Other Prioritization 10 
‘equal-probability’ condition) of encountering pencils and pens (i.e., self-owned vs. friend-owned 
objects) during the task. We hypothesized that a self-ownership effect would emerge only under 
conditions of stimulus uncertainty (Golubickis et al., 2018, 2019). To identify the processes 
underpinning task performance, data were submitted to an HDDM analysis (Wiecki et al., 2013).  
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Seventy-two undergraduates (17 male, Mage = 20.82, SD = 3.57) took part in the research.
1 
Two participants (male) failed to follow the instructions by responding with invalid key presses, 
thus were excluded from the analyses. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual 
acuity. Informed consent was obtained from participants prior to the commencement of the 
experiment and the protocol was reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee at the School of 
Psychology, University of Aberdeen, Scotland. The experiment had a 2 (Expectancy: none vs. 
equal) X 2 (Owner: self vs. friend) mixed design with repeated measures on the second factor. 
 
Stimulus Materials and Procedure 
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually, were greeted by the experimenter, seated 
in front of a desktop computer, and informed that the experiment comprised an object-classification 
task featuring two categories of objects; pencils and pens. Following Golubickis et al. (2018), 
participants were told that, prior to the commencement of the task, the computer had randomly 
assigned one category of objects to them (i.e., owned-by-self) and the other category of objects to 
their best friend (i.e., owned-by-friend). That is, participants owned all the items (i.e., pencils or 
 
1 Based on Golubickis et al. (2018), G*Power (f = .29,  = .05, power = 80%) revealed a requirement of 72 participants 
to detect the hypothesized interaction (Experiment 1). For subsequent repeated-measures designs (i.e., Experiments 2 & 
3), 36 participants were recruited. 
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pens) from one of the categories, and their best friend owned all the items from the other category. 
They then pressed the spacebar on the keyboard and text appeared revealing who had been assigned 
the pencils and pens, respectively (e.g., you = pencils, friend = pens). Assignment of the objects to 
self and friend was counterbalanced across the sample.  
The experimenter then explained that, on the computer screen, participants would be 
presented with a series of pictures of individual pencils and pens and their task was simply to report 
(via a button press), as quickly and accurately as possible, whether the item belonged to them or to 
their friend. Prior to the commencement of the task, a pencil sketch of a box (containing pencils and 
pens) appeared on the screen, giving indicative information about the trial structure during the task 
(see Supplementary Material for the sketches used in the current experiments). Importantly, for half 
the participants, the box comprised 50% pens and 50% pencils, thereby indicating there would be 
an equivalent number of self-owned and friend-owned items presented during the task (i.e., equal-
probability, 50/50 condition). For the other participants, in contrast, the box was closed, so no 
information was available about the frequency of the trials (i.e., stimulus-uncertainty condition). 
Responses were given using two buttons on the keyboard (i.e., N & M). Key-response mappings 
were counterbalanced across participants and the labels ‘mine’ and ‘friend’ were located above the 
relevant response buttons. 
Each trial began with the presentation of a central fixation cross for 1000 ms, followed by 
the picture of a pencil or pen for 100 ms. After each object was presented, the screen turned blank 
until participants reported the owner of the item (i.e., self or friend). Following each response, the 
fixation cross reappeared and the next trial commenced. The two categories of stimuli comprised 
photographs of 28 unique objects (14 pencils and 14 pens) that were taken from Google images and 
edited using Photoshop CS6, such that each pencil or pen was oriented obliquely from the left-
bottom to the right-top corner (see Supplementary Material). Images were 140 X 140 pixels in size, 
greyscale, and matched for luminance. Participants initially performed 16 practice trials, followed 
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by one block of 224 trials in which all stimuli occurred equally often in a random order, with 112 
trials in each condition (i.e., self-owned trials vs. friend-owned trials). All that differed across the 
task was that half the participants (i.e., equal-probability condition) had prior knowledge about the 
frequency of the trials. On completion of the task, participants were debriefed, thanked, and 
dismissed. 
Results and Discussion 
Response Time and Accuracy 
Responses faster than 200 ms were excluded from the analysis (Golubickis et al., 2018; Sui 
et al., 2012), eliminating less than 1% of the overall number of trials. As the response window was 
set to 2000 ms, no outlier screening was performed for slow responses (Golubickis et al., 2018). A 
multilevel model analysis was used to examine the response time (i.e., correct responses) and 
accuracy data (see Figure 1). Analyses were conducted with the R package ‘lmer4’ (Pinheiro, Bates, 
DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Development Core Team, 2015), with Expectancy and Owner modelled as 
fixed effects and participants as a crossed random effect (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012). Analysis 
of the RTs (correct responses) yielded a main effect of Owner (b = -.004, SE = .001, t = -3.25, p 
= .001), such that responses were faster to self-owned (M = 509 ms, SD = 97 ms) compared to 
friend-owned (M = 523 ms, SD = 103 ms) items. A significant Expectancy X Owner (b = .004, SE 
= .001, t = 2.75, p = .006) interaction also emerged. Further analysis of the interaction revealed that, 
when no expectancy was provided, responses were faster to self-owned compared to friend-owned 
objects (b = -.008, SE = .002, t = -4.36, p < .001). In contrast, no such effect emerged when 
participants were aware that equal numbers of self-owned and friend-owned objects would be 
presented during the task (an additional Bayesian analysis yielded moderate evidence for the null 
effect, BF01 = 5.43).  
 A multilevel logistic regression analysis on the accuracy of responses yielded a main effect 
of Owner (b = -.060, SE = .025, z = -2.40, p = .016), such that responses were more accurate for 
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friend-owned (M = 88%, SD = 10%) than self-owned (M = 86%, SD = 12%) items. A significant 
Expectancy X Owner (b = -.185, SE = .025, z = -7.43, p < .001) interaction also emerged. Further 
analysis of the interaction revealed that, when no information about the frequency of trials was 
provided, responses were more accurate to self-owned compared to friend-owned objects (b = .125, 
SE = .036, z = 3.50, p < .001). This effect reversed when participants were aware that equal 
numbers of self-owned and friend-owned objects would be presented during the task (b = -.245, SE 
= .035, z = -7.07, p < .001). 
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Figure 1. Task Performance (upper panel = RT, lower panel = accuracy) as a function of 
Expectancy and Target (Experiment 1). Error bars represent +1 SEM. Significant differences 
between conditions are depicted with asterisks: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001. 
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Drift Diffusion Modeling 
 To identify the processes underpinning task performance, data were submitted to an HDDM 
analysis following the same outlier screening as the RT/accuracy analyses. HDDM is an open-
source software package written in Python for the hierarchical Bayesian estimation of drift diffusion 
model parameters (Wiecki et al., 2013). This approach assumes that the model parameters for 
individual participants are random samples drawn from group-level distributions and uses Bayesian 
statistical methods to estimate all parameters at both the group and individual-participant level 
(Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, & Lee, 2011). Models were response coded, such that the upper 
threshold corresponded to an ‘owned-by-self’ response and the lower threshold to an ‘owned-by-
friend’ response (Golubickis et al., 2018, 2019). 
Seven models were estimated for comparison (see Table 1). First, to investigate whether 
task performance was underpinned by differences in the efficiency of stimulus processing (i.e., 
stimulus bias), a model that allowed the drift rate (v) to vary as a function of Expectancy (i.e., no 
expectancy vs. equal expectancy) and Target (i.e., owned-by-self vs. owned-by-friend) was 
estimated. In the second model, starting point (z) was allowed to vary as a function of Expectancy. 
The third model allowed threshold separation (a) to vary across Expectancy and in the fourth model 
both starting point (z) and threshold separation (a) were allowed to vary as a function of 
Expectancy. These models (2-4) investigated whether task performance was underpinned by 
differences in information-sampling requirements (i.e., response bias). Finally, to examine whether 
task performance was underpinned by both stimulus and response biases, three models were 
estimated in which combinations of drift rate (v), starting point (z) and threshold separation (a) were 
allowed to vary. In all models, inter-trial variability was estimated for drift rate (sv), starting point 
(sz), and non-decision time (st). 
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Table 1. Deviance information criterion (DIC) for each model (Experiment 1). 
 
Model  Expectancy  Owner  Fixed    DIC 
1.  v   v  a, z  -10772 
2.  z   -  a, v  -10898  
3.  a   -  v, z  -10217 
4.  a, z   -  v  -10218 
5.  v, z   v  a  -11121 
6.  a, v   v  z  -10772 
7.  a, v, z   v  -  -11124 
Note. a = threshold separation, v = drift rate, z = starting point.   
 
 
Bayesian posterior distributions were modeled using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
with 10,000 samples (with 1,000 burn in samples). As can be seen in Table 1, model 7 yielded the 
best fit (i.e., lowest Deviance Information Criterion value, DIC). The DIC was adopted as it is 
routinely used for hierarchical Bayesian model comparison (Spiegelhalter, Best, & Carlin, 1998). 
As diffusion models were fit hierarchically rather than individually for each participant, a single 
value was calculated for each model that reflected the overall fit to the data at the participant- and 
group-level. Lower DIC values favor models with the highest likelihood and least number of 
parameters. To further evaluate the best fitting model, a standard model comparison procedure used 
in Bayesian parameter estimation — Posterior Predictive Check (PPC) — was performed (Wiecki 
et al., 2013). For the best fitting model, the posterior distributions of the estimated parameters were 
used to simulate data sets. We then assessed the quality of model fit by plotting the observed data 
against the simulated data for the .1, .3, .5, .7, and .9 response-time quantiles for each experimental 
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condition (Krypotos, Beckers, Kindt, & Wagenmakers, 2015). This revealed good model fit (see 
Supplementary Material for associated plots). 
Inspection of the posterior distributions for the best fitting model indicated that task 
performance was underpinned by a combination of response and stimulus biases (see Table 2). 
When no expectancy was provided, comparison of the observed starting value (z = .53) with no bias 
(z = .50) yielded extremely strong evidence for a response bias (pBayes(bias > 0.50) = .001),
2 such 
that less information was needed to generate owned-by-self compared to owned-by-friend 
responses. There was no evidence for a starting point difference when self-owned and other-owned 
objects were equally likely to appear (z = .51). In addition, there was moderate evidence for a 
difference in threshold separation (pBayes(none > equal) = .058), indicating that responses were more 
cautious when no expectancy (vs. equal) was provided. Finally, strong evidence for a stimulus bias 
was observed, revealing that information uptake was faster for friend-owned than self-owned 
objects, but only in the equal-probability condition (pBayes(owned-by-friend > owned-by-self) 
= .006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Bayesian p values quantify the degree to which the difference in the posterior distribution is consistent with the 
hypothesis. For example, a Bayesian p of .05 indicates that 95% of the posterior distribution supports the hypothesis. 
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Table 2. Parameter means and the upper (97.5q) and lower (2.5q) quantiles of the best fitting model 
(Experiment 1). 
 
 
                   Quantile  
Diffusion Model Parameter   Mean    2.5q   97.5q  
anone     1.144    1.037   1.258  
aequal     1.027    0.919   1.141 
vnone/self-trial    3.108    2.686   3.543 
vnone/friend-trial   -3.061   -3.491  -2.651 
vequal/self-trial    2.631    2.193   3.067 
vequal/friend-trial   -3.395   -3.837  -2.960   
znone     0.529    0.510   0.548 
zequal      0.512    0.492   0.532 
t0     0.347    0.333   0.362 
sv     1.219    1.067   1.377 
sz     0.569    0.515   0.620 
st     0.212    0.207   0.217 
Note. a = threshold separation, v = drift rate, z = starting point, t0 = non-decision time, sv = inter-
trial variability in drift rate, sz = inter-trial variability in starting point, st = inter-trial variability in 
non-decision time. 
 
 
 Experiment 1 provided evidence that stimulus predictability moderates the emergence of the 
self-ownership effect during an object-classification task. Replicating Golubickis et al. (2018, 
2019), under conditions of stimulus uncertainty (i.e., no trial-related information was available), 
compared with pencils or pens owned by a friend, identical self-owned items elicited faster 
responses. In contrast, self-prioritization failed to emerge when participants were cognizant that 
self-owned and friend-owned objects were equally likely to appear. In other words, stimulus 
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predictability eliminated the self-ownership effect. Also replicating Golubickis et al. (2018, 2019), 
under conditions of stimulus uncertainty, self-prioritization was underpinned by a response bias 
(White & Poldrack, 2014). Specifically, less evidence was needed to generate owned-by-self 
compared to owned-by-friend responses. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that, at least in 
an object-ownership task, self-bias derives from the adoption of an egocentric decision-making 
strategy, but crucially only under conditions of stimulus uncertainty.  
 
Experiment 2 
 To date, only self-relevant objects have been reported to yield ownership effects (e.g., 
Constable et al., 2019; Golubickis et al., 2018; Truong et al., 2017). The results of Experiment 1, 
however, suggest that it should be possible to trigger comparable processing benefits for material 
that belongs to other individuals. Specifically, if people are forewarned about the likelihood of 
encountering self-owned or friend-owned objects then — when the latter objects predominate 
during the task (i.e., comprise the expected response) — a friend-prioritization effect should 
emerge. That is, responses should be facilitated to friend-owned compared to self-owned items (cf. 
Golubickis et al., 2018, 2019). Thus, by providing prior information about which items are most 
likely to be encountered during the object-classification task (i.e., self-owned or friend-owned), it 
should be possible to generate both self- and friend-ownership effects. Extending Experiment 1, 
stimulus prevalence was manipulated within participants and, as previously, data were submitted to 
an HDDM analysis to identify the processes underpinning task performance (Wiecki et al., 2013).                
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Method 
Participants and Design 
Thirty-six undergraduates (7 male, Mage = 20.19, SD = 1.67) took part in the research. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Informed consent was obtained from 
participants prior to the commencement of the experiment and the protocol was reviewed and 
approved by the Ethics Committee at the School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen, Scotland. 
The experiment had a 3 (Expectancy: self-expected vs. friend-expected vs. equal) X 2 (Owner: self 
vs. friend) repeated-measures design. 
 
Stimulus Materials and Procedure 
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually, were greeted by the experimenter, seated 
in front of a desktop computer, and informed that the experiment comprised an object-classification 
task featuring two categories of objects; pencils and pens. The task closely followed Experiment 1, 
but with an important modification. In the current study, participants completed three blocks of 
trials in which the likelihood that self-owned and friend-owned objects would be presented was 
manipulated. Prior to the commencement of each block, a pencil sketch of a box (containing 
varying numbers of pencils and pens) appeared on the screen conveying diagnostic information 
about the frequency of trials during the block (e.g., Block 1, 75% pens & 25% pencils; Block 2, 
25% pens & 75% pencils; Block 3, 50% pens & 50% pencils). The order of presentation of the 
blocks was counter-balanced across participants, with each block comprising 224 trials (e.g., Block 
1, 168 self-trials & 56 friend trials; Block 2, 56 self-trials & 168 friend-trials; Block 3, 112 self-
trials & 112 friend-trials). On completion of the task, participants were debriefed, thanked, and 
dismissed. 
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Results and Discussion 
Response Time and Accuracy 
Responses faster than 200 ms were excluded from the analysis, eliminating less than 1% of 
the overall number of trials. A multilevel model analysis of the RTs (correct responses) yielded a 
main effect of Expectancy (b = .003, SE = .001, t = 2.27, p = .023), such that responses were faster 
for friend-owned (M = 470 ms, SD = 76 ms) than self-owned (M = 473 ms, SD = 75 ms) items. In 
addition, a significant Expectancy X Owner (b = -.037, SE = .001, t = -27.76, p < .001) interaction 
emerged (see Figure 2). Further analysis of the interaction revealed that, when self-trials were 
expected, responses were faster to self-owned compared to friend-owned objects (b = -.028, SE 
= .002, t = -14.64, p < .001). In contrast, when friend-trials were expected, responses were faster to 
friend-owned than to self-owned objects (b = .034, SE = .002, t = 16.09, p < .001). No difference 
emerged when self-trials and friend-trials were equally probable (an additional Bayesian analysis 
yielded moderate evidence for the null effect, BF01 = 4.69).   
A multilevel logistic regression analysis on the accuracy of responses yielded a main effect 
of Owner (b = -.103, SE = .021, z = -5.04, p < .001), such that responses were more accurate to 
friend-owned (M = 84%, SD = 14%) than to self-owned (M = 82%, SD = 16%) items. In addition, a 
significant Expectancy X Owner (b = .912, SE = .027, z = 34.24, p < .001) interaction emerged (see 
Figure 2). Further analysis of the interaction revealed that, when self-trials were expected, 
responses were more accurate to self-owned compared to friend-owned objects (b = .771, SE 
= .038, z = 20.33, p < .001). In contrast, when friend-trials were expected, responses were more 
accurate to friend-owned than to self-owned objects (b = -1.035, SE = .041, z = -25.18, p < .001). 
When self and friend-trials were equally likely, responses were more accurate to friend-owned 
compared to self-owned objects (b = -.084, SE = .034, z = -2.49, p = .013).    
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Figure 2. Task Performance (upper panel = RT, lower panel = accuracy) as a function of 
Expectancy and Target (Experiment 2). Error bars represent +1 SEM. Significant differences 
between conditions are depicted with asterisks: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001. 
 
 
Drift Diffusion Modeling 
 As in Experiment 1, seven models in which combinations of drift rate (v) varying as a 
function of Expectancy (i.e., self-expected vs. friend-expected vs. equal) and Owner (i.e., self vs. 
friend), and starting point (z) and threshold separation (a) varying as a function of Expectancy were 
estimated for comparison. As can be seen from Table 3, model 7 yielded the best fit (i.e., lowest 
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DIC value). To further evaluate the model fit, a PPC was also performed. This revealed good model 
fit (see Supplementary Material for associated plots). 
 
 
Table 3. Deviance information criterion (DIC) for each model (Experiment 2). 
 
Model  Expectancy  Owner  Fixed    DIC 
1.  v   v  a, z  -20922 
2.  z   -  a, v  -23598 
3.  a   -  v, z  -19209 
4.  a, z   -  v  -22231 
5.  v, z   v  a  -23046 
6.  a, v   v  z  -21732 
7.  a, v, z   v  -  -24957 
Note. a = threshold separation, v = drift rate, z = starting point.  
 
 
Inspection of the posterior distributions for the best fitting model indicated that task 
performance was underpinned by a combination of response and stimulus biases (see Table 4). 
When self-trials were expected, comparison of the observed starting value (z = .62) with no bias (z 
= .50) revealed extremely strong evidence for a response bias (pBayes(bias  > .50) < .001), such that 
less information was needed to generate owned-by-self compared to owned-by-friend responses. 
Similarly, extremely strong evidence for a response bias was also observed when friend-trials were 
expected (z = .31), indicating that less information was required when generating owned-by-friend 
than owned-by-self responses (pBayes(bias  < .50) < .001). No evidence for a starting point difference 
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emerged when self-trials and friend-trials were equally probable (z = .49). Also, no differences in 
threshold separation were observed. Finally, when friend-trials were expected, strong evidence for a 
stimulus bias was observed (pBayes(owned-by-self > owned-by-friend) = .022), such that information 
uptake was faster for self-owned than friend-owned items.  
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Table 4. Parameter means and the upper (97.5q) and lower (2.5q) quantiles of the best fitting model 
(Experiment 2). 
 
   
                   Quantile  
Diffusion Model Parameter   Mean    2.5q   97.5q  
aself-expected    1.133    1.045   1.217 
afriend-expected    1.133    1.043   1.230 
aequal     1.134    1.048   1.227 
vself-expected/self-trial   2.401    2.015   2.788 
vself-expected/friend-trial  -2.479   -2.875  -2.010 
vfriend-expected/self-trial   2.828    2.447   3.236 
vfriend-expected/friend-trial  -2.245   -2.636  -1.846 
vequal/self-trial    1.989    1.590   2.356 
vequal/friend-trial   -1.904   -2.289  -1.499  
zself-expected    0.621    0.595   0.647 
zfriend-expected    0.309    0.284   0.334 
zequal     0.494    0.466   0.522 
t0     0.282    0.272   0.293 
sv     0.131    0.006   0.299 
sz     0.357    0.357   0.357 
st     0.144    0.144   0.144 
Note. a = threshold separation, v = drift rate, z = starting point, t0 = non-decision time, sv = inter-
trial variability in drift rate, sz = inter-trial variability in starting point, st = inter-trial variability in 
non-decision time. 
 
 
The results of Experiment 2 challenge the exclusivity of the self-ownership effect 
(Golubickis et al., 2018, 2019). As expected, stimulus prioritization was sensitive to the likelihood 
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of encountering self-owned and friend-owned items during an object-classification task. 
Specifically, whereas self-prioritization was observed when self-owned-items were expected, this 
switched to friend-prioritization when friend-owned-items comprised the predominant stimuli. 
Corroborating Experiment 1, when self-owned and friend-owned items were equally likely to 
appear, stimulus prioritization was abolished. Underpinning the observed ownership effects were 
differences in the evidential requirements of response generation. Notably, less evidence was 
needed when responding to probable than improbable objects, regardless of their owner. These 
findings confirm that response biases arise when one outcome is more likely than another, such that 
the starting point of evidence accumulation is closer to the probable than improbable response 
threshold (De Loof et al., 2016; Domenech & Dreher, 2010; Dunovan et al., 2014; Mulder et al., 
2012; White & Poldrack, 2014). Thus, depending on the prevalence of self-owned or friend-owned 
objects, it is possible to generate both self- and friend-ownership effects during decisional 
processing. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 2 revealed that stimulus prioritization is moderated by the likelihood of 
encountering self-owned and friend-owned items during an object-classification task. Specifically, 
when either self-owned or friend-owned objects comprised the predominant stimuli, it was possible 
to trigger self- and friend-ownership effects, respectively. Based on previous research, a feature of 
the adopted paradigm was that knowledge of the task structure (i.e., likelihood of encountering 
pencils or pens during a particular block) served as a reliable predictor of the upcoming 
experimental trials (De Loof et al., 2016; Dunovan et al., 2014). That is, when participants were 
informed that the majority of trials would pertain to self-owned (or friend-owned) items (e.g., 75% 
self-trials & 25% friend-trials), this mapped directly onto the frequency with which the objects were 
presented during the task. This, of course, raises an interesting question. What would happen if 
prior expectancies were disconfirmed by the frequency of stimulus presentation during the task (i.e., 
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prior beliefs are inaccurate)? For example, participants expected to encounter self-owned (or friend-
owned) objects but, in reality, friend-owned (or self-owned) items were in the majority. Under 
conditions such as these, we suspect inaccurate prior expectancies (both self-related and friend-
related) would be superseded by prioritization effects based on the objects that predominated during 
the task (i.e., self-owned or friend-owned). That is, participants would optimize a probabilistic 
representation of the immediate stimulus environment, such that prioritization (i.e., self or friend) 
would emerge for the most frequent items.  
Method 
Participants and Design  
Thirty-six undergraduates (11 male, Mage = 20.14 SD = 1.91) took part in the research. Four 
participants (1 male) failed to follow the instructions by responding with invalid key presses, thus 
were excluded from the analysis. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. 
Informed consent was obtained from participants prior to the commencement of the experiment and 
the protocol was reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee at the School of Psychology, 
University of Aberdeen, Scotland. The experiment had 2 (Expectancy: self-expected vs. friend-
expected) X 2 (Owner: self vs. friend) repeated measures design. 
 
Stimulus Materials and Procedure 
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually, were greeted by the experimenter, seated 
in front of a desktop computer, and informed that the experiment comprised an object-classification 
task featuring two categories of objects; pencils and pens. The task closely followed Experiment 2, 
but with two modifications. First, as stimulus-prioritization was not observed when self-owned and 
friend-owned objects were equally likely to be presented during the task (see Expts. 1 & 2), this 
condition was dropped. Second, across two blocks of trials, although participants expected either 
self-objects or friend-objects to predominate (e.g., Block 1, 75% self-objects & 25% friend-objects; 
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Block 2, 75% friend-objects & 25% self-objects), in reality the opposite was the case (e.g., Block 1, 
25% self-objects & 75% friend-objects; Block 2, 25% friend-objects & 75% self-objects). The order 
of the experimental blocks was counter-balanced across participants and each block comprised 224 
trials (e.g., 168 self-trials & 56 friend-trials). On completion of the task, participants were 
debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. 
Results 
Response Time and Accuracy 
Responses faster than 200 ms were excluded from the analysis, eliminating approximately 
2% of the overall number of trials. A multilevel model analysis of the RTs (correct responses) 
yielded a main effect of Expectancy (b = -.008, SE = .002, t = -4.94, p < .001), such that responses 
were faster in the self-expected (but friend-predominated) condition (M = 495 ms, SD = 88 ms) than 
the friend-expected (but self-predominated) condition (M = 514 ms, SD = 92 ms). A main effect of 
Owner (b = -.003, SE = .002, t = -2.03, p = .042) was also observed, indicating that RTs were faster 
to self-owned (M = 501 ms, SD = 86 ms) compared to friend-owned (M = 508 ms, SD = 94 ms) 
items. Finally, a significant Expectancy X Owner (b = .019, SE = .002, t = 10.95, p < .001) 
interaction emerged (see Figure 3). Further analysis of the interaction revealed that, when self-trials 
were expected (but friend-trials predominated), responses were faster to friend-owned compared to 
self-owned objects (b = .014, SE = .003, t = 6.07, p < .001). In contrast, when friend-trials were 
expected (but self-trials predominated), responses were faster to self-owned than to friend-owned 
objects (b = -.021, SE = .002, t = -8.44, p < .001). 
A multilevel logistic regression analysis on the accuracy of responses revealed a significant 
Expectancy X Owner (b = -.629, SE = .032, z = -19.95, p < .001) interaction (see Figure 3). Further 
analysis of the interaction revealed that, when self-trials were expected (but friend-trials 
predominated), responses were more accurate to friend-owned compared to self-owned objects (b = 
-.598, SE = .045, z = -13.23, p < .001). In contrast, when friend-trials were expected (but self-trials 
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predominated), responses were more accurate to self-owned than to friend-owned objects (b = .671, 
SE = .044, t = 15.16, p < .001).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Task Performance (upper panel = RT, lower panel = accuracy) as a function of 
Expectancy and Target (Experiment 3). Error bars represent +1 SEM. Significant differences 
between conditions are depicted with asterisks: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001. 
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Drift Diffusion Modeling  
Following Experiments 1 and 2, seven models in which combinations of drift rate (v) 
varying as a function of Expectancy (i.e., self-expected vs. friend-expected) and Target (i.e., owned-
by-self vs. owned-by-friend), and starting point (z) and threshold separation (a) varying as a 
function of Expectancy were estimated for comparison. As can be seen from Table 5, model 4 
yielded the best fit (i.e., lowest DIC value). To further evaluate this model, a PPC was also 
performed (Wiecki et al., 2013). This revealed good model fit (see Supplementary Material for 
associated plots). 
 
 
Table 5. Deviance information criterion (DIC) for each model (Experiment 3). 
 
Model  Expectancy  Owner  Fixed    DIC 
1.  v   v  a, z  -8076 
2.  z   -  a, v  -11435 
3.  a   -  v, z  -9950 
4.  a, z   -  v  -21570 
5.  v, z   v  a  -14749 
6.  a, v   v  z  -11031 
7.  a, v, z   v  -  -12188 
Note. a = threshold separation, v = drift rate, z = starting point.  
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Inspection of the posterior distributions for the best fitting model revealed that task 
performance was underpinned by a response bias (see Table 6). When self-trials were expected but 
friend-trials predominated, comparison of the observed starting value (z = .40) with no bias (z = .50) 
revealed extremely strong evidence for a response bias (pBayes(bias  < .50) < .001), such that less 
information was needed to generate owned-by-friend compared to owned-by-self responses. 
Similarly, strong evidence for a response bias also emerged when friend-trials were expected but 
self-trials predominated (z = .62), indicating that less information was required when generating 
owned-by-self than owned-by-friend responses (pBayes(bias  > .50) < .001). No differences in 
threshold separation were observed.  
 
 
Table 6. Parameter means and the upper (97.5q) and lower (2.5q) quantiles of the best fitting model 
(Experiment 3) 
 
  
                  Quantile 
Diffusion Model Parameter  Mean   2.5q  97.5q  
aself-expected   1.213   1.161  1.397  
afriend-expected   1.275   1.096  1.321 
v    3.031   2.680  3.383 
zself-expected   0.396   0.366  0.427 
zfriend-expected   0.622   0.591  0.652 
t0    0.322   0.306  0.337 
sv    1.065   0.961  1.170 
sz    0.446   0.446  0.446 
st    0.208   0.208  0.208 
Note. a = threshold separation, v = drift rate, z = starting point, t0 = non-decision time, sv = inter-
trial variability in drift rate, sz = inter-trial variability in starting point, st = inter-trial variability in 
non-decision time. 
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These findings develop and extend the effects observed in Experiment 2. Regardless of the 
prior expectancy that was in place (i.e., expect self-owned objects or expect friend-owned objects), 
stimulus prioritization was driven by the objects that predominated during the task, resulting in the 
generation of both self- and friend-ownership effects. This reveals that participants were sensitive to 
discrepancies between their inaccurate prior beliefs and the prevalence of self-owned and friend-
owned objects during the task. Corroborating Experiments 2 and 3, these ownership effects were 
underpinned by differences in the evidential requirements of response generation, such that less 
information was needed when responding to frequent compared to infrequent objects (De Loof et 
al., 2016; Domenech & Dreher, 2010; Dunovan et al., 2014; Mulder et al., 2012; White & Poldrack, 
2014). These findings demonstrate the flexibility of ownership effects in task contexts in which 
prior beliefs are disconfirmed by ongoing sensory experiences (O’Callaghan, Kveraga, Shine, 
Adams, & Bar, 2017; Otten, Seth, & Pinto, 2017).   
 
General Discussion 
A rapidly expanding literature has demonstrated the effects of self-relevance on decision-
making (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015, 2017; Sui & Rotshtein, 2019). 
Compared to stimuli paired with other social targets, those associated with the self are privileged 
during decisional processing, a prioritization effect that is argued to be restricted to self-relevant 
material. Challenging this assumption, using an object-ownership paradigm, here we showed that 
stimulus prioritization was sensitive to prior expectations about the prevalence of forthcoming items 
(owned-by-self vs. owned-by-friend) and whether these beliefs were supported during the task. 
Under conditions of stimulus uncertainty (i.e., no prior beliefs), replicating previous research, 
objects were classified more rapidly when owned-by-self compared to owned-by-friend (Golubickis 
et al., 2018, 2019). When, however, the frequency of stimulus presentation either confirmed or 
disconfirmed prior expectations, ownership effects were observed for both self-owned and friend-
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owned objects. These effects, moreover, were underpinned by a common underlying mechanism — 
the evidential requirements of response generation (White & Poldrack, 2014). Regardless of their 
owner, participants required less information when responding to probable compared to improbable 
stimuli (De Loof et al., 2016; Dunovan et al., 2014). These findings establish that, at least in the 
context of an object-ownership task, stimulus prioritization effects can be generated for targets 
other than the self.  
The Anatomy of Self-Prioritization 
Inspection of the extant literature on self-prioritization yields an interesting observation. The 
apparent inevitability and exclusivity of the self-prioritization effect derives, for the most part, from 
studies that have used either Sui et al.’s (2012) original shape-matching task or variants of this 
paradigm (Frings & Wentura, 2014; Mattan et al., 2015; Payne et al., 2017; Schäfer, Frings, & 
Wentura, 2016; Schäfer et al., 2015; Wozniak & Knoblich, 2019). Indeed, in other experimental 
contexts, self-prioritization has proved considerably less reliable (Falbén et al., 2019; Siebold et al., 
2015; Stein et al., 2016; Wade & Vickery, 2018). For example, using breaking continuous flash 
suppression (b-CFS) to explore the ease with which stimuli (i.e., Gabors) access visual awareness, 
Stein et al. (2016) reported no effect of self-relevance on the time taken for objects to overcome 
interocular suppression (cf. Macrae, Visokomogilski, Golubickis, Cunningham & Sahraie, 2017). 
Interestingly, however, a standard self-prioritization effect was observed in a prior Gabor-label 
matching task. Similarly, Siebold et al. (2015) found no evidence that self-relevance enhanced the 
detection of stimuli (i.e., tilted lines associated with the self and a stranger) in a rapid oculomotor 
search paradigm, although again a self-prioritization effect emerged in an earlier line-label 
matching task. Collectively these findings contest the assertion that, beyond explicit stimulus-label 
matching tasks, self-prioritization is an obligatory effect (Sui & Humphreys, 2017). Rather than 
representing a mandatory facet of social cognition, self-prioritization has the characteristics of a 
task-dependent phenomenon (Caughey, Falbén, Tsamadi, Persson, Golubickis, & Macrae, in press). 
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Work exploring the self-ownership effect also highlights the conditional automaticity of 
self-prioritization (Constable et al., 2019; Falbén et al., 2019). As noted previously, when required 
to report which of two objects initially appeared on the computer screen (i.e., temporal order 
judgment task) — a mug owned-by-self or a mug owned-by-the-experimenter — participants were 
biased toward reporting that self-owned items appeared first (Constable et al., 2019; Expt. 1). This 
effect was eliminated, however, when the requested judgment was orthogonal to the dimension of 
interest (i.e., ownership). That is, when participants were asked to report whether a mug appeared to 
the left or right of fixation, self-prioritization was abolished (Expt. 3; but see Truong et al., 2017). 
Corroborating this finding, in an object-classification task, Falbén et al. (2019) demonstrated that 
self-relevance only facilitated performance when task sets (e.g., reporting the ownership or identity 
of stimuli) directed attention to previously formed target-object associations (Hommel, 2004). 
When emphasis switched instead to a perceptual appraisal of stimuli, self-prioritization failed to 
emerge (Siebold et al., 2015; Stein et al., 2016). At a minimum, therefore, self-prioritization appears 
to necessitate task sets that facilitate access to target-object relations in memory (Kiefer, 2007; 
Maxfield, 1997). 
Extending previous research on this topic, at least in the context of ownership, the current 
findings challenge the putative exclusivity of self-prioritization during object processing 
(Golubickis et al., 2018, 2019). Confirming that previous demonstrations of the self-ownership 
effect were driven by an egocentric response-related strategy, but only under conditions of stimulus 
uncertainty (i.e., Expt. 1), here we provided evidence for the emergence of both self- and other-
ownership effects when either accurate (i.e., Expt. 2) or inaccurate (i.e., Expt. 3) prior beliefs were 
provided. Interestingly, the manner in which stimulus-related expectancies were manipulated was 
likely crucial to the emergence of this effect. Previously, using a sequential version of the shape-
label matching task, Sui et al. (2014) demonstrated that self-prioritization was unaffected by the 
probability of stimulus presentation. That is, self-prioritization emerged even when self-relevant 
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(vs. other-relevant) stimuli appeared on only a minority of shape-label matching trials. It should be 
noted, however, that Sui et al. (2014) did not manipulate prior beliefs about the likelihood of 
stimulus presentation during the shape-label matching task. As such, the insensitivity of self-
prioritization to inter-trial stimulus contingencies does not speak to the effect that prior beliefs exert 
on task performance. For example, on a block-by-block or trial-by-trial basis (De Loof et al., 2016; 
Dunovan et al., 2014), prior information about the likelihood that self-relevant (or other-relevant) 
stimuli will be presented may wield considerable influence during a shape-label matching task (Sui 
et al., 2014). 
The Origins of Self-Prioritization 
 According to influential theoretical accounts, self-prioritization is a perceptual phenomenon 
(Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015). Through reciprocal connections between 
regions of the prefrontal (vMPFC) and temporal (posterior STS) cortices, a Self-Attention Network 
(SAN) enhances the visual salience of self-relevant (vs. other-relevant) stimuli, thus triggering a 
self-prioritization effect (but see Schäfer & Frings, 2019). As it turns out, however, evidence for 
this viewpoint is limited (e.g., Constable et al., 2019; Golubickis et al., 2017; Janczyk et al., 2019; 
Macrae, Visokomogilski, Golubickis, & Sahraie, 2018; Reuther & Chakravarthi, 2017; Siebold et 
al., 2015; Stein et al., 2016). Indeed, disputing the perceptual account, recent research suggests that, 
during shape-label matching tasks, self-prioritization emerges during a capacity-limited stage of 
central processing, thereby pinpointing short-term memory operations as a potential source of this 
effect (Janczyk et al., 2019; Reuther & Chakravarthi, 2017). Ownership tasks similarly fail to yield 
evidence that self-prioritization originates in variation in the efficiency of perceptual processing. 
Rather, differences in the evidential requirements of response generation underpin the self-
ownership effect (Golubickis et al., 2018, 2019). Replicating this finding, here we also showed that 
participants required less information when generating owned-by-self compared to owned-by-other 
responses. Critically, however, an equivalent response bias also underpinned the emergence of a 
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friend-prioritization effect, thereby furnishing further evidence for the post-perceptual origin of 
ownership effects.     
In the current experimental context, stimulus prioritization was sensitive to the extent to 
which prior beliefs about the prevalence of to-be-judged items were confirmed or disconfirmed by 
the frequency of object presentation during the task. Thus, consistent with a Bayesian account of 
decision-making — whereby predictions are updated in accordance with new information (Bar, 
2007; Chater & Oaksford, 2008; O’Callaghan et al., 2017; Otten et al., 2017) — task performance 
was impacted by the combination of prior knowledge and trial-by-trial sensory experiences. These 
effects, moreover, emerged whether objects were self-owned or belonged to a friend (Moutoussis, 
Fearon, El-Deredy, Dolan, & Friston, 2014). Notwithstanding the absence of self-other differences 
in stimulus prioritization, such effects may nevertheless exist. Of importance may be the manner in 
which bias is defined and assessed. Take, for example, the stability of decisional biases. In 
Experiment 3, inaccurate prior beliefs were overridden by the frequency of stimulus presentation, 
whether the to-be-judged items were owned-by-self or owned-by-friend. It is possible, however, 
that the rate at which priors are updated may vary as a function of target (i.e., self vs. other), 
reflecting the status of the self as a fundamental information-processing hub (Humphreys & Sui, 
2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015, 2017; Sui & Rotshtein, 2019). In addition, updating may be 
sensitive to specific properties of objects — including valence and value — that have implications 
for the self-concept (e.g., self-enhancement motivation, Golubickis et al., in press; Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2008) or people’s evaluations of others. Using appropriate methodological/analytical 
techniques, a useful task for future research will be to explore these issues. 
To develop a comprehensive understanding of item prioritization (both self and other), 
additional research should probe the effects of object relevance in subtle and indirect ways using 
diverse tasks, stimuli, and measures (Constable et al., 2019; Falbén et al., 2019; Macrae et al., 2018; 
Siebold et al., 2015; Stein et al., 2016; Sui et al., 2012; Truong et al., 2017). It remains to be seen 
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whether the current effects would extend to paradigms in which the stimuli have greater meaning 
for people and self-object relations are created and assessed in different ways (e.g., perceptual-
matching tasks, prior-entry effects, visual search). For example, it is possible that, in combination 
with a response-bias, prioritization effects may be underpinned by differences in the efficiency of 
visual processing (i.e., drift rates) when stimuli have particular significance for people or the 
difficulty of the task is increased (Golubickis et al., in press). In addition, although the current 
findings demonstrate that self-prioritization can be eliminated by prior knowledge indicating the 
prevalence of to-be-judged stimuli, whether this is consistently the case remains an open question. 
That is, whether self-relevance or stimulus probability is used as a heuristic to drive information 
processing likely reflects the influence of the specific task context, the items under consideration, 
and people’s prevailing goal states.     
In extending the current line of inquiry, a less rigid characterization of the self-concept 
should be adopted. To date, work in this area has tended to portray the self as a monolithic 
cognitive structure (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Gu, 2017; Sui & Humphreys, 2017), a formerly 
commonplace but now outdated theoretical viewpoint. Rather than comprising a unitary 
representation, the self-concept is a dynamic, multifaceted construct, shaped by the interplay of 
cultural forces, pre-existing knowledge, situational factors, and transient processing concerns 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; McConnell, 2011; Oyserman, 2007). This nuanced conception 
has obvious implications for stimulus prioritization. Just as processing is sensitive to between-target 
differences (Sui et al., 2012, 2014), so too it may be responsive to the significance or meaning that 
stimuli hold for individuals given the specific aspect of the self-concept (or friend-concept) that is 
active at any given moment (i.e., within-person differences, see Golubickis et al., 2017, in press; 
Macrae et al., 2018). Operating in this way, identity-based processing provides the flexibility that 
optimal social-cognitive functioning demands. Of interest, therefore, would be work exploring how 
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prior beliefs about identity-relevant components of the self-concept (or friend-concept) together 
with ongoing sensory experiences influence stimulus prioritization.   
 
Conclusion 
 Challenging the assumption that stimulus prioritization is restricted to self-relevant material 
(Golubickis et al., 2018, 2019; Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015, 2017), here we 
demonstrated that prior beliefs in combination with stimulus prevalence moderate the emergence of 
both self- and other-ownership effects. Furthermore, these effects were underpinned by differences 
in the evidential requirements of response generation, such that less information was needed when 
responding to likely (vs. unlikely) objects, regardless of their owner (De Loof et al., 2016; Dunovan 
et al., 2014). Whether the non-exclusivity of self-prioritization extends to other task contexts, 
however, has yet to be established.   
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